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This paper proposes approaches to break down the boundaries that reduce the ability of the health workforce to
respond to population needs, or workforce flexibility.
Accessible health services require sufficient numbers and types of skilled workers to meet population needs.
However, there are several reasons that the health workforce cannot or does not meet population needs. These
primarily stem from workforce shortages. However, the health workforce can also be prevented from responding
appropriately and efficiently because of restrictions imposed by professional boundaries, funding models or
therapeutic partitions. These boundaries limit the ability of practitioners to effectively diagnose and treat patients by
restricting access to specific skills, technologies and services. In some cases, these boundaries not only reduce
workforce flexibility, but they introduce inefficiencies in the form of additional clinical transactions and costs, further
detracting from workforce responsiveness.
Several new models of care are being developed to enhance workforce flexibility by enabling existing staff to work
to their full scope of practice, extend their roles or by introducing new workers. Expanding on these concepts, this
theoretical paper proposes six principles that have the potential to enhance health workforce flexibility, specifically:
1. Measure health system performance from the perspective of the patient.
2. Minimise training times.
3. Regulate tasks (competencies), not professions.
4. Match rewards and indemnity to the levels of skill and risk required to perform a particular task, not professional
title.
5. Ensure that practitioners have all the skills they need to perform the tasks required to work in the environment in
which they work
6. Enable practitioners to work to their full scope of practice delegate tasks where required
These proposed principles will challenge some of the existing social norms around health-care delivery; however,
many of these principles are already being applied, albeit on a small scale. This paper discusses the implications of
these reforms.
Proposed discussion points:: 1. Is person-centred care at odds with professional monopolies?
2. Should the state regulate professions and, by doing so, protect professional monopolies or, instead, regulate
tasks or competencies?
3. Can health-care efficiency be enhanced by reducing the number of clinical transactions required to meet patient
needs?
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The workforce accounts for the greatest proportion of
recurrent health expenditure in most health settings.
Increasingly, health workforce shortages are corresponding
with growing demands on the health-care system and con-
tinuing growth in health-care expenditure [1]. Staff short-
ages not only limit health-care accessibility but are a key
factor in health-care quality and safety [2,3]. Growing
health-care costs mean that simply employing and training
more of the same types of worker is not a sustainable
solution. Instead, innovative solutions are required to use
existing workforce resources more efficiently.
Health workforce flexibilities have been introduced
variously as a way to increase organisational efficiency,
address workforce shortages and better meet patient
needs [4]. A flexible workforce is described as one with
the ability to ‘employ and pay at normal rates just suffi-
cient labour to meet the workload at any point in time’
[5]. From a patient perspective, truly accessible care
relies on the provision of appropriate health care in the
right place at the right time [6]. However, the health
workforce is relatively inelastic because of the way that
tasks and skills are bound to traditional professional role
boundaries [7]. This paper explores mechanisms to
enhance flexibility within the health workforce.
A truly flexible workforce has the potential to optimise
health-care accessibility by ensuring timely responses to
labour shortages, by avoiding the lengthy and expensive
training regimes required to fully train many health
providers and by distributing health resources in a way
that more efficiently meets the needs of the patient. The
interactions and interrelationships that influence work-
force flexibility mean that it is a complex area to examine.
For the purpose of consistency, the health workforce
referred to in this paper includes any qualified or unquali-
fied person involved in the paid delivery of health or social
care, and they are referred to as a ‘practitioner’. This
includes the clinical and administrative workforces within
allied health, medicine, nursing and social care.
Workforce flexibility is receiving increasing international
attention [8]. For instance, rural health workforce shortages
have resulted in proposals to remove legal and professional
barriers to practice to promote flexible service delivery
[9,10]. A number of health policies explicitly acknowledge
the importance of workforce flexibility both to help address
workforce shortages and to enhance patient-centred care
[11-13]. However, most examples of workforce change tend
to involve localised, small-scale projects that take place
within the normative frameworks of the existing profes-
sional paradigms. They largely involve role negotiation
between a small number of professions [7], rather than
wholesale redesign of the workforce. There is limited
research into systemic approaches to implementing
large-scale workforce flexibilities [14].Some of the most powerful levers of health workforce
flexibilities have been unintended. In particular, there
are several examples of change initiated by workforce
shortages in certain professions resulting from, for
example, outbreaks of disease [15,16], war [17] and
major policy changes, such as the European Working
Time Directive [18]. The implications of these shortages
were the redistribution of roles to other types of
workers, growth of new workers and ultimately an
expanded repertoire of skills for some [7,19]. The
European Working Time Directive, which placed a cap
on the maximum number of working hours for doctors,
coincided with several workforce re-engineering projects
[20-23].
Other unintended levers of workforce change have
included the introduction of contestability in health-care
delivery [24,25]. For example, Borthwick highlights the
way that the introduction of new managerialism in the
National Health Service (NHS), in the form of general
practitioner fundholding, enabled podiatric surgeons to
compete with orthopaedic surgeons to secure formal rec-
ognition to practice autonomously in the NHS. Podiatric
surgeons provided evidence of cost-effectiveness and
quality of their services, demonstrating that they were able
to help address a range of quality standards including
waiting times and patient satisfaction. This was in the face
of opposition from the British Medical Association
surgeons, who proposed that surgical services should only
be provided under the control of medical practitioners.
Other levers for change have included crises in health-
care delivery, such as the Bristol Royal Infirmary case of
systemic failures which led to the unnecessary deaths of
several children undergoing heart surgery [26]. The out-
come of this inquiry challenged the way that professions
were regulated, and led to new external accountabilities,
with a fundamental shift from profession-centric to
patient-focused regulation [27].
Occupational monopolies and occupational imperialism
Common sense, and a growing evidence base, suggests
that with appropriate training and supervision, a great
deal of health-care can be delivered by more than one
type of practitioner [28]. Logic should dictate that any
person credentialed to perform a specific task or role
should be able to undertake that role. However, the nor-
mative model of the health workforce assumes that there
is a ‘right’ type of practitioner to deliver specific types of
care [29].
The health workforce is organised around groups of
professions that embrace a repertoire of pre-defined
skills within a unifying philosophy, codified through
formal education and measured by the achievement of
specific competencies. This principle, known as social
closure, is the way that professions create a unique
Nancarrow Human Resources for Health 2015, 13:9 Page 3 of 12
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/13/1/9identity and monopolise a body of knowledge [30].
Professions engage in strategies to prevent competitors
from encroaching into their task and knowledge
domains, while at the same time attempting to adopt
skills and roles from competing professions [29,31,32].
Consequently, professional repertoires have evolved,
historically, through market opportunism and negoti-
ation rather than necessarily on the basis of logic, evi-
dence or patient needs [7,33]. Social closure is upheld
by state acceptance and endorsement of professions
through legislation and regulation [34]. In other words,
the professions become a type of state-endorsed brand,
where a professional brand is seen as a unique market-
ing message that conveys a sense of perceived value for
consumers and differentiates it from other providers of
those products.
One consequence of the monopoly afforded by social
closure is an underlying assumption that those professions
that have adopted a specific repertoire of skills are the only
group of practitioners with the ability or authority to per-
form those tasks. This is illustrated by the demand for evi-
dence that a credentialed worker can safely and effectively
perform tasks that have formed the traditional skill base of
other professions. For example, over the past decade, a
great deal of research and published literature has been
dedicated to demonstrating that nurses can perform tasks
as effectively as doctors [35]. There are also several illustra-
tions of role renegotiation and turf wars between doctors,
allied health, nursing and the assistant workforce [36],
reinforcing the assumption of ‘ownership’ of specific core
tasks by particular workers. These socially constructed role
boundaries reduce workforce flexibility by limiting task
and role transfer between different types of practitioners.
To help overcome this, workforce planning tools have been
developed that deconstruct tasks and reallocate them to
workers based on levels of risk and patient need, rather
than traditional role boundaries [37,38]. In many cases, the
renegotiation of roles results in professions retaining tasks
that they see as being core to their professional identity
while discarding those roles that they see as dispensable
[25,31,39]. The relative ability of different professions to
negotiate and maintain their ‘brand’ depends largely on
their level of state protection and the degree of influence of
one profession over another [29,40-42].
Barriers to flexibility
Patient care can be compromised when health practitioners
lack access to the full range of skills or technology neces-
sary to fully achieve their therapeutic goals [26]. Instead,
they have to refer to a suite of other practitioners to achieve
their therapeutic or treatment goal, referred to here as a
therapeutic partition. In health, therapeutic partitions arise
where practitioners lack access to appropriate diagnostic in-
vestigations (such as diagnostic radiography or pathology),are prevented from performing minor procedures (such as
suturing), are restricted from accessing medication that is
needed to fully treat a patient or are unable to make direct
referrals to other practitioners or institutions [43]. The con-
sequence of therapeutic partitions is that patients have to
make multiple clinical transactions to achieve a single
therapeutic goal. Therapeutic partitions risk being more
expensive [44] and more time-consuming than having a
diagnosis and intervention provided by a single appropri-
ately skilled practitioner or co-located team. There has been
little explicit examination of therapeutic partitions; how-
ever, the growth of approaches designed to streamline and
integrate health services is an implicit acknowledgement of
this problem. In settings that normally involve multiple care
transitions, or ‘handovers’, such as in emergency care, it is
well acknowledged that these points create vulnerabilities
in care delivery [28].
Some of the causes of therapeutic partitions are regula-
tory, such as restricted access to prescribing. Health finan-
cing models are also responsible for built-in inefficiencies.
Health services that are funded variously by different
agencies, such as federal–state or public–private payers,
create perverse incentives for organisations to shift costs
between sectors and providers, which are not necessarily
in the best interests of the patient [29,45]. Therapeutic
partitions can result from funding models that limit state
reimbursement for services to referrals made by specific
types of practitioners. For example, state reimbursement
for radiographs may be limited to referrals by medical
practitioners, even though others, such as physiotherapists
or podiatrists, may be credentialed to order these diagnos-
tic tests [43]. Similarly, general practitioners (GPs) have
been restricted from directly accessing magnetic reson-
ance imaging (MRI) in some jurisdictions, yet evidence
shows that patients whose GPs could access MRI achieved
slightly better outcomes [46] and care was more cost
effective [44]. Consequently, a more expensive service
(such as a medical practitioner or medical consultant)
becomes an additional clinical transaction in the achieve-
ment of the diagnostic goal.
More expensive or specialised services are often explicitly
or implicitly rationed by requiring patients to obtain refer-
rals to access these services. However, the referral itself
creates an additional clinical transaction with a financial
and opportunity cost for the patient and health system.
This is particularly inefficient when referrals are required
to access practitioners who are otherwise ‘first-contact’
practitioners. For instance, in Australia, direct state reim-
bursement for many allied health services is only possible
following assessment and referral by a GP, after completing
a client care plan [30]. There are several examples of other-
wise qualified practitioners being unable to make direct
referrals to other practitioners and services, such as
hospital admissions [47].
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to new or more efficient ways of working. For instance,
non-medical prescribing is available in several jurisdictions
with some additional training and credentialing [31,32];
and many allied health professionals can directly order
diagnostic radiographs; Instead, the inefficiencies arise
from historic ways of working, interdisciplinary role
disputes, by more dominant health professions exerting
control over the roles of other workers [12,35,36], the
provision of state funding for some services and not
others, the failure to fully delegate work to a lower cost
worker when appropriate [39] and inefficient therapeutic
partitions.
There have been some attempts to overcome these in-
efficiencies by better coordinating care [29] and creating
integrated service models [37]. Interdisciplinary teamwork
can facilitate the blurring of role boundaries, and better un-
derstanding of other workers’ roles, so that team members
can more flexibly meet patient needs [48,49]. However, the
complex renegotiation of roles through interdisciplinary
engineering and retrofitted models of service integration
could be seen as a system failure in instances when, instead,
it may be possible for a single, appropriately trained practi-
tioner or an appropriately organised team to do the job.Models of labour flexibility
Atkinson’s model of labour market flexibility is widely used
and describes five domains of workforce flexibility [50]:
1. External numerical flexibility, which refers to
adjustments to the overall workforce capacity. In the
health workforce, this typically takes place through
modifications to training and facilitating workforce
migration. The European Working Time Directive
was one initiative which had a major flow-on
effect to numerical flexibility across the health
workforce [18].
2. Internal numerical flexibility, which involves
structural adjustments to the workplace that allow
workforce capacity to adjust to service needs. For
instance, flexibility in team structures enable staff to
be deployed to the areas of greatest need at the
appropriate time and reduce the amount of lost
activity due to downtime. Examples include the
introduction of flexible terms and conditions of
employment, such as annualised hours, employee
self-rostering and strategies to reduce staff turnover.
3. Functional flexibility is the extent to which staff
roles are transferrable within an organisation.
Delegation and role substitution is used increasingly
as a mechanism to increase the flexibility of the
health workforce [7]. However, functional flexibility
is often limited by therapeutic partitions arisingfrom regulatory and financial boundaries around the
nature of health work.
4. Locational flexibility examines flexibility in terms of
the location of working and is becoming increasingly
important in the delivery of accessible health
services to people with geographic or other
restrictions. Telehealth is becoming an important
intervention to address locational flexibility [51].
5. Wage flexibility is the determination of pay levels
based on demand and the individual costs of
employment, rather than on a collective basis.
The changing nature of employment contracts is an-
other way to introduce workforce flexibility [52]. Examples
of contractual approaches to flexibility include ‘outsour-
cing’ the workforce, where the employer sub-contracts the
provision of labour to an intermediary such as an agency.
Specific flexibilities can be built into employer–employee
contracts to accommodate fluctuations in service demand.
The risk of these flexible models is that service flexibility
is provided at the expense of employment conditions for
workers. Additionally, changing contractual accountabil-
ities between workers and employers introduces new
requirements for monitoring the quality and outcomes of
care [53].
These domains explain several of the levers that can
be used to influence health workforce flexibility as part of
a concept known as the ‘flexible firm’ in which workforce
flexibility is used to drive cost containment and demand
management [4]. The flexible firm enables employers to
achieve flexibility [54] through segmenting the workforce
into a ‘core’ of full-time employees with a ‘periphery’ of
part-time or sub-contracted workers [55]. However, this
model has been criticised on the basis that the core–
periphery dualism belies the complexity of workforce
restructure [55] and that ‘peripheral’ flexibilities are be-
ing applied to a wider cadre of occupational categories
than initially assumed [56].
This potential for workforce flexibility is reflected in
the growth of the delegatory workforce, such as support
workers, including therapy assistants, health-care assis-
tants and therapy aides [57]. It is reinforced through
competency-based frameworks such as the Calderdale
Framework, which triages worker skills to meet patient
needs based on skills and risk, not traditional role
boundaries [37].
In addition to introducing new roles, there is mount-
ing evidence that more efficient use of staff can benefit
the patient and the health service. For example, involving
extended scope GPs [58] and allied health practitioners in
the triage, assessment and treatment of patients on special-
ist/surgical waiting lists can reduce patient waiting times
and result in more appropriate referrals to medical special-
ists [59]. There are other examples of practical role shifting
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number of non-radiographers perform diagnostic ultra-
sound [60], pharmacists can prescribe in some jurisdictions
[61] and foot surgery is performed by some podiatrists [24].
Workforce shortages, alongside an increasing focus on
patient-centred care, call for a labour supply that can
respond to patient needs, rather than just practitioner,
service or organisational drivers. Increasingly, traditional
health-care providers are allocating tasks to other practi-
tioners, such as support workers, freeing the more highly
trained practitioners to manage patients with complex
needs. However, health workforce responsiveness is ham-
pered by historic models of role delineation which are
strongly socially entrenched and reinforced by regulatory
and funding models.
Six principles to enhance workforce flexibility
To address the points raised above, this paper proposes
six interrelated principles that can be considered to
promote role flexibility in the health workforce. The six
principles described here differ from the traditional
approaches to achieving flexibility because they start
from the perspective of the patient, specifically:
1. Measure health system performance from the
perspective of the patient.
2. Minimise training times.
3. Regulate tasks (competencies), not professions.
4. Match rewards and indemnity to the levels of skill
and risk required to perform a particular task, not
professional title.
5. Ensure that practitioners have all the skills they need
to perform the tasks required to work in the
environment in which they work.
6. Enable practitioners to work to their full scope of
practice delegate tasks where required.
Principle 1: Measure health system performance from the
perspective of the patient
There have been widespread moves to implement patient-
centred approaches to care and move away from trad-
itional, institutionally based, hierarchically focused models
of health-care delivery. However, inefficiencies arise be-
cause of traditional role boundaries that result in patients
being passed between a range of different professionals to
achieve a therapeutic end [14].
Several recent examples of minor workforce innova-
tions illustrate how a small shift in emphasis from the
practitioner to the patient can facilitate improvements.
A good example is telehealth, which is widely credited
with reducing travel times and travel costs for patients
[51]. However, as the costs of travel are largely borne by
the patients, not the services, these benefits are rarely
factored into decisions to implement telehealth if theefficiencies are not to be translated into reduced service
costs [62]. Similarly, the effectiveness of workforce
reform is often difficult to capture because of the down-
stream effects of changing health service processes [14].
For example, there is evidence that using allied health
professionals to triage surgical waiting lists can reduce
patient waiting times; at the same time, such services
increase the likelihood that patients referred to the sur-
geon will require surgery [59]. The system level result of
this approach is a condensation of demand for surgical
services because a higher proportion of the surgeon’s
workload requires more intensive intervention. This in
turn increases the cost of those services because more of
the surgeon’s time is spent delivering more expensive
services. However, the societal benefits of reducing the
rates of disability that may arise from having large num-
bers of patients untreated on a waiting list for a long
period are rarely measured or factored into decisions
around waiting list management [14].
Consistent approaches are required to measure and
capture the outcomes of workforce change interventions
[14]. Focusing on the needs of the end user, rather than
the service or practitioner, will promote the development
of measures to standardise the way that workforce
change interventions are described and enable comparison
between interventions.
Unless the entire health system starts from the
principle of ensuring that the outcome is optimal for the
patient, widespread reform and efficiencies are difficult
to achieve. While a great deal of rhetoric surrounds the
ideals of patient-centred care, the funding models and
fragmentation of health-care in many health systems do
little to support this principle.
The implementation of this principle is likely to rely on
an unambiguous, macro (policy) level focus on meaningful,
patient-centred goals of health-care delivery, such as acces-
sibility (including waiting times and care close to home)
and quality. For example, various international policy
targets to reduce waiting times for elective surgery and in
emergency care have resulted in system changes that have
successfully reduced waiting times for patients [63-65],
several using workforce flexibilities. Performance targets
based on quality and accessibility in primary health care in
the United Kingdom NHS led to improvements in some
aspects of care, in part, through increased workforce flexi-
bility, although the benefits of these were not sustained
under a pay-for-performance scheme [66]. Regulatory
systems should uphold this principle by privileging patient
safety above professional protection.
The shift towards truly patient-centred measures of
health system effectiveness still has some way to go. How-
ever, the relatively recent introduction of funding models
that follow the patient, rather than the system, may
enhance patient-centred models of care.
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Training is the traditional way to increase external
numerical flexibility. Despite widespread workforce
shortages, there has been little debate around the
relationship between the length or models of health-care
training and health workforce flexibility. Long training
times increase costs and reduce the responsiveness of the
workforce to meet changing needs [67]. Most traditional
models of health profession training require students to
complete an extended period (normally several years) of
university education before they achieve a single, market-
able skill [67,68]. Paradoxically, training times for many
health professions have increased in the face of widespread
workforce shortages. For instance, many allied health and
nursing training programmes in Australia and the USA
have expanded from 3- to 4-year undergraduate (bache-
lor’s degree) training programmes, graduate entry master’s
degrees or, in some case, doctoral-level training [68-70].
Similar trends are evident in nursing [71]. In Australia and
the UK, post-graduate training for medical practitioners is
an increasingly dominant model [22,23] and is the norm
in the USA.
Most health practitioner education requires access to
several hundred hours of supervised clinical training.
Clinical training infrastructure can be expensive for stu-
dents [72], training institutions and supervisors. There is
evidence that poorly conceived clinical placements are a
burden on health service delivery [73], although well-
constructed placements may enhance service efficiency
[74]. Thus, the models of clinical training also have the
potential to enhance or detract from service delivery and
capacity.
There is an urgent need to rethink the way that health
professionals are trained so that the workforce can
respond to needs in a cost-effective and timely way. One
innovative solution involves a shift away from the time-
based achievement of qualifications to the incremental
achievement of specific competencies [75]. Flexible
training models, such as step-on, step-off programmes,
allow the incremental credentialing of practitioners by
providing several exit points throughout the course of
professional training. This means that workers have a
marketable skill, more quickly, that can be responsive to
the context in which they work [76,77].
Incremental training also facilitates opportunities for
micro-specialisms. Micro-specialisms involve a short
training time to learn a particular task to meet a specific,
focused (and often, high volume) need. Examples of micro-
specialisms include newborn hearing screening specialists,
phlebotomists, cast technicians and foot care assistants.
Incremental training approaches have the potential to
increase workforce flexibility by enabling practitioners to
take on a repertoire of skills that are appropriate for the
context in which they work, rather than dictated by historicprofessional boundaries. For example, providers of home-
based rehabilitation services are often required to deliver
tasks that are the traditional domain of another profession
[78]. It may make more sense for a single, multi-skilled
practitioner to deliver these tasks than bring a team of prac-
titioners to deliver specialised components of the job. These
tasks are often negotiated between the professionals and
may require additional training. Incremental credentialing
enables the practitioner to formally adopt these tasks as a
part of a repertoire of skills that is fit for purpose and
context.
A recent Australian project to support the introduc-
tion of a rural allied health generalist used a structured
workforce change tool (the Calderdale Framework) to
identify tasks that had the potential to be shared
between rural and remote allied health practitioners
from six discrete allied health disciplines [39]. The study
identified 337 discrete clinical tasks. Of these, 45% were
already delivered by more than one profession and 127
tasks were deemed as appropriate for skill sharing across
two or more professions. Interestingly, in contrast with
the sociological literature that emphasises jurisdictional
‘turf wars’ [7], the tasks were negotiated consensually by
the participating professions, which may be associated
with workforce shortages due to the rural context and
the lack of dominance of any one professional group.
The shared tasks were repackaged into 13 categories
based on functional and diagnostic categories, rather
than traditional professional repertoires. A recommen-
dation of the study was that the 13 reconfigured bundles
of tasks should be made available to allied health practi-
tioners to support their more generic roles in rural and
remote clinical practice. Incremental credentialing of
allied health professionals would support this approach.
The expanding knowledge economy is beginning to
challenge the traditional role of higher education in the
delivery of professional training [79]. In particular, there
is pressure to increase the explicit relationships between
education, knowledge production and translation, and
economic benefit. Decades ago, Gibbons and colleagues
[80] proposed a shift in knowledge production from a
unidisciplinary, institutionally, hierarchically based ap-
proach (Mode 1) to transdisciplinary, non-hierarchical,
reflexive approaches that are based around collaborating
to address problems in a specific and localised context
(Mode 2). Traditional models of health practitioner
training are largely embedded in Mode 1 approaches,
focusing on the ownership of a professionally discrete body
of knowledge. Interprofessional training approaches suggest
a move towards Mode 2 training; however, many of these
approaches appear to start from the perspective of profes-
sional role renegotiation than from patient need [14].
To help address these issues in the health context,
health practitioner training could be shifted from
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based education, where the trainees contribute to
health service delivery while learning their profession
with the support of ‘outsourced’ formal university
training [77]. At the same time, workforce flexibilities
could potentially be increased by shortening training
times through the achievement of specific milestones
rather than time-based achievement of competen-
cies [75].
Principle 3: Regulate tasks (competencies), not
professions
State regulation of professions, rather than specific compe-
tencies, reduces flexibility in two ways. First, professions
need to demonstrate competence in a large number of do-
mains before they are deemed fit for practice, prolonging
training times. Yet, the achievement of some competencies,
incrementally, may provide individuals with skills that are
marketable well before they achieve their professional status
(such as micro-specialisms). Second, when the bundled
competencies become part of a professional repertoire, role
boundaries are generally dictated by professional politics
and history rather than patient needs [7]. State regulation
of professions provides a stamp of legitimacy over the juris-
dictional claims of the professions, reinforcing their profes-
sional branding.
Several authors have debated the relationship between
professional monopolies and state regulation [81-83].
However, few challenge the repertoires that go together to
make up the professional portfolio. This principle chal-
lenges the assumption that a single profession should have
unique ownership over a particular professional repertoire.
Instead, the tasks and skills that form that repertoire
should be examined and credentialed individually and
anyone deemed competent to perform a particular task
should be enabled to do so.
The recognition of specific competencies allows for a
responsive, flexible workforce in several ways. For ex-
ample, existing professions can develop a portfolio of
competencies that are relevant to their field or practice
context. The example of the rural health generalist in
Australia is a clear illustration of a portfolio of compe-
tencies that cross traditional professional jurisdictions to
meet local needs [39].
Disentangling specific competencies from traditional
professional repertoires is likely to emphasise the levels of
expertise required to perform these roles. This principle
does not suggest that highly skilled, high-risk tasks should
be available to all practitioners. Indeed, high-risk and
expensive tasks would be likely to come under greater
scrutiny if they were contested on the basis of quality, effi-
cacy and cost, not professional titles (as illustrated by the
case of the podiatric surgeons and natural therapies
below). Specific tasks could then be clearly governed,monitored and reimbursed around a current evidence
base [84].
Similarly, there have been proposals to remove state
reimbursement for tasks that are not deemed to be evi-
dence based, such as homeopathy [85]. However, the
coupling of professions with tasks was reinforced in the
scope of a recent Australian review on private health
insurance rebates for natural therapies which stated that it
included ‘only natural therapies that are not provided by a
health professional accredited under the Australian Health
Practitioner Regulation Agency’ [86]. This explicit coup-
ling of professions with tasks belies the fact that registered
professionals often perform tasks that are outside their ac-
cepted repertoire [87] and deliver tasks that have a limited
evidence base including the use of natural therapies [85].
It risks creating inequities by allowing registered profes-
sionals to be reimbursed for performing tasks that
non-registered practitioners cannot.
This principle does not mean that professions should
cease to exist, rather that state recognition and monitoring
should be based on the levels of competence and risk,
rather than historic professional ‘bundles’ of skills. Instead,
professions could continue to be supported through their
respective professional bodies who could continue to
uphold professional standards, such as quality, while
reflecting patient-centred values.
Removing state protection of professional monopolies
means that professions will have to compete with other
providers to deliver those tasks. The professions will
need to use other strategies to maintain their profes-
sional branding. There will be much greater self-interest
by the professions to promote their brand and explicitly
self-regulate on the basis of patient quality and safety.
This is reinforced in the earlier example of the podiatric
surgeons successfully competing with orthopaedic sur-
geons to deliver foot surgery by using explicit indicators
of quality and efficiency.
Being a member of a professional body will be seen as
an explicit endorsement of professional values, and pro-
fessions will have greater self-interest in removing those
members who fail to adhere to the standards defined by
their profession.
One challenge of separating competencies from pro-
fessions is a lack of consumer knowledge about which
services to purchase, although there is little evidence to
suggest that consumers or health-care purchasers are
currently well informed to make judgements about the
appropriateness or quality of health services outside of
the hospital setting [68,88,89]. This may need to be ad-
dressed through brokerage, such as service commissioning
on behalf of the service user. In many cases, this would
simplify worker roles. For instance, aged care workers
could be trained to in a wide range of skills necessary to
treat older people (for example, foot care skills, support
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linary team who negotiate to perform these skills between
them [90].
Regulation is an important component of this principle.
The separation of regulation from professions provides a
much more flexible and responsive way for new tasks or
technologies to be introduced safely onto the market. The
credentialing of practitioners based on individual compe-
tencies may sound onerous and time-consuming; however,
this is the basis of most existing training courses for pro-
fessions. Tools already exist to define and allocate tasks to
appropriate practitioners on the basis of competence and
risks [37].
The United Kingdom’s NHS introduced a competency-
based framework, the Knowledge and Skills Framework
(KSF) which standardised competency levels across all non-
medical professionals; however, the ability of this model to
enhance workforce flexibility is limited by the overlaying of
traditional professional boundaries and career hierarchies
[91]. The separation of ‘medical’ competencies from this
framework also restricts the direct transfer of activity
between a wide range of professionals, instead reinforcing
the separation of medicine from non-medical professionals.
Principle 4: Match rewards and indemnity to the levels of
skill and risk required to perform a particular task, not
professional title
Existing regulation and insurance systems are largely
profession based. This principle builds on the concept of
recognising competencies, rather than professions, and
reimbursing levels of skill and risk as opposed to a trad-
itional professional repertoire. It also draws on Atkinson’s
concept of wage flexibility, in which payment is negotiated
on the basis of the individual costs of employment, rather
than collectively, by professional groups.
In other words, lower risk, less skilled tasks should
attract a lower fee and therefore be performed by lower
cost workers [92]. Such a model would rapidly frag-
ment health work so that skills and risks were matched
by the appropriate level of worker and reimbursement.
Similarly, risks and indemnity levels would need to
match specific tasks which would subsequently be
reflected in pricing.
This type of competency-based model would also
begin to challenge existing occupational monopolies.
This point is well illustrated in the earlier example of the
podiatric surgeons who successfully contested the delivery
of foot surgery on the basis of quality and price. The role
negotiations were facilitated by a managerial policies model
during a time of orthopaedic workforce shortages. The re-
sult was the development of the micro-specialism of foot
surgery performed by podiatrists, rather than orthopaedic
surgeons, which is now integrated with mainstream surgi-
cal services in many jurisdictions in the United Kingdom.Other analyses of workforce redistribution have illustrated
how managerial pressures in primary care lead to role
devolution and evolution [93].
The use of diagnosis-related groups is one method of
reimbursement that draws on a bundle of attributes
surrounding a diagnosis or procedure that is not directly
linked to professions, which have the ability to reward
and influence health-care quality [94] and could lead to
efficiencies through role redesign.
Principle 5: Ensure that practitioners have all the skills
they need to perform the tasks required to work in the
environment in which they work
As outlined above, patient-centred care is often compro-
mised because of therapeutic boundaries, where practi-
tioners lack access to the full scope of technologies and
techniques to be able to provide a full, therapeutic
intervention.
Diabetes care is a good example. Australian guidelines
for best practice in diabetes care [95] recommend input
from a diabetes educator, suggesting ‘The diabetes educator,
within their scope of practice, can often spend more time
than the general practitioner has available, consolidating
the patient’s knowledge and skills regarding eating plan,
physical activity, self-monitoring, medication usage, initi-
ation and support with insulin therapy, foot care etc.’ (p 19).
The guidelines also recommend input from a range of
other professionals, including podiatrists, dietitians,
endocrinologist, exercise professionals and ophthalmol-
ogists, under the coordination of a GP. Diabetes affects
around 1.7 million Australians, many of whom will
have limited access to any of the guidelines’ suggested
professionals. A truly patient-centred model would ensure
high levels of accessibility to all of the skills necessary to
treat and support people with diabetes, rather than having
those skills devolved across a wide range of professional
repertoires. Such a model can occur with multidisciplinary
teams of practitioners skilled to deliver the specific tasks
or, more efficiently, ensure that a single practitioner has
the skills necessary to address the majority of patient
needs. The task sharing approach developed by the rural
allied health practitioners may be an appropriate model in
this context.
However, this principle raises questions about the role
of specialisation in the workforce. Specialisation involves
the adoption of specific expertise, generally in a smaller
proportion of the workforce, as there is less demand for
these skills [7,96]. To address this, there are several
examples of ‘hub and spoke’ models of care, in which
the more generalist practitioner delivers care closer to
the patient with support from a more specialised practi-
tioner who is located nearer more specialised facilities,
for instance, the use of hub and spoke models of rural
surgical support [97], the use of telehealth to deliver
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support workers in community-based rehabilitation ser-
vices whose roles incorporate tasks from range of different
practitioners which they deliver directly to the patient with
team-based supervision [99].
Principle 6: Enable practitioners to work to their full
scope of practice delegate tasks where required
An efficient workforce would have staff working to their
full scope of practice the majority of the time and not
performing tasks that can be delegated to other practi-
tioners [100]. This principle relies on practitioners being
able to delegate tasks that do not require their highest
levels of expertise [8].
There is limited evidence suggesting that nurses and
allied health practitioners do not work to their full scope
of practice [101-103]. In many cases, the boundaries
defining the scope of practice of a profession are unclear
[102]. For most professions, the scope of practice is
defined by competencies that are agreed by and
endorsed by the professional body that oversees or
regulates the workforce, adjusted to different contextual
circumstances.
Several inefficiencies arise in health-care delivery be-
cause of barriers that prevent health practitioners from
working to their full scope of practice [100,104]. A re-
cent Ministerial Taskforce commissioned by the Minister
for Health in Queensland, Australia, identified numerous
tasks in which allied health practitioners were educated,
competent and authorised to practice, but restricted
from performing these duties due to legislative, adminis-
trative, policy and traditional approaches to practice
[43,102]. Examples of these barriers included practi-
tioners who normally have first contact status in the care
pathway requiring patients to have referrals to access
those services, diagnostic practitioners (such as radiogra-
phers) not being able to comment on investigations and
practitioners unable to make direct referrals to other
practitioners or services without going through an
intermediary. The consequences of these therapeutic
boundaries are additional clinical transactions for the
patient, additional service costs and delays in health-
care delivery. Queensland Health is introducing a suite
of key performance indicators to remove the thera-
peutic partitions identified in the Ministerial Taskforce.
Disentangling roles from professions and the regula-
tion and reimbursement for competencies, rather than
professions, would enhance this approach.
Conclusion
It makes little practical or economic sense for medically
trained practitioners to insert or remove sutures or rou-
tinely give vaccinations or for a 4-year qualified podiatrist
to cut toenails when a vocationally trained micro-specialistcan deliver the role just as effectively [93,105]. While these
debates are not new [92], the barriers to workforce reform
that rely on role renegotiation have been hampered by
interdisciplinary role disputes still, largely under the ban-
ner of medical hegemony [93]. Negotiating a truly flexible
workforce depends on being able to separate the politics
from the roles and placing the patient at the centre of care
delivery.
The 21st century health workforce needs to be able to
respond to the changing demands of the population.
The principles presented in this paper may seem conten-
tious; however, they attempt to start to challenge the highly
complex, social construction that reflects the way that
health services are currently recognised and rewarded.
Additionally, as the examples in this paper illustrate, many
of these principles are already gradually being implemented,
albeit, under different labels and on a small scale.
There is some evidence to suggest that the current
workforce model is flawed, demonstrated by the widespread
workforce re-engineering that takes place. For instance, the
growth of interprofessionalism and transprofessionalism
suggests market failure. Professions train in silos and are
then retrained to work across boundaries, adopting aspects
of another’s work relevant to the context. This model sug-
gests that practitioners are not trained to be fit for purpose,
resulting in inefficiencies and overtraining. Instead of repro-
filing existing professions or workers, surely it makes sense
to train practitioners appropriately for the context in which
they will work.
The six principles presented in this paper propose that
the 21st century workforce could be more flexibly and
appropriately arranged around specific tasks that are
organised in ways that meet the needs of the population,
not the professions. Additionally, the revolving door be-
tween GPs, diagnostic, therapeutic and specialist services
should be examined for the inefficiencies that could be
removed if the gate-keeping functions and therapeutic
partitions were removed.
The introduction of new workforce flexibilities has im-
plications for service users, policy-makers, workforce plan-
ners, managers, service providers, third-party payers,
regulators and educators. In particular, for the workforce
to adopt new roles, new systems of regulation and ac-
countability will be required to facilitate changes in the
scope of practice, to ensure that the appropriate training
and accreditation exist and to protect service users and
workers.
A challenge of moving towards a portfolio of compe-
tencies is that current systems of professional reward
and recognition are based largely on unidisciplinary spe-
cialisation [91]. Stepping off a traditional professional
trajectory will require new models to support career
pathways based on risk and competence, not historical
professional hierarchies.
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the changing requirements of modern health-care systems.
The rapid growth of the unregulated workforce, such as
support workers and allied health assistants, has quality
and safety implications. Additionally, third-party payers
and other funders will need to introduce mechanisms to
recognise the roles and input of non-traditional providers
of care.
Should the professions cease to exist and be replaced
by a generic workforce? The principles proposed in this
paper suggest a continuum, with a generic workforce at
one end, defined by a contextually relevant bundle of
tasks or competencies that can be repackaged according
to the needs or requirements of the end user. At the
other end of the continuum lie the professions, with
professional branding, history, culture and reputation.
The middle ground is currently negotiated through in-
terprofessional and transprofessional role renegotiation,
where professions largely preserve their own identity by
retaining ‘core’, defining tasks and the renegotiation and
reallocation of ‘peripheral’ tasks that are less essential to
their core identity [39]. We are already seeing a growing
generic workforce, particularly in the unregistered arena.
However, generic workers continue to co-exist alongside
the professions. Without large-scale policy and/or fund-
ing changes, it is likely that the generic workforce will
continue to grow, while the professional exclusivity will
gradually erode due to increasing competition for their
core tasks [7]. The sociology literature suggests that pro-
fessions are robust, self-preserving entities, particularly
when they are supported by the state [106]. In the ab-
sence of regulatory support, it is possible that strong
professional branding may provide a competitive edge
by reinforcing the perceived value of the professions in
the eyes of the public and policy-makers. However, in an
increasingly de-regulated, competitive, consumer-led
marketplace, the health workforce of the future is likely
to look very different to the workforce of today.
Placing the service user, not the professions, at the centre
of workforce models has the potential to radically reshape
the way that health-care is delivered in the 21st century,
while delivering efficiencies and new ways of working.
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